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Abstract 
By opening markets the European union has been also an economic success. However, with 
respect to political organization the European Union is far less accomplished. The misguided 
concept of a successful Europe consists in mistaking integration for harmonization and 
homogenization. But the essence of Europe is its diversity. No steps have been taken to actively 
institutionalize competition between governmental units at all levels. The welfare of European 
citizens could be improved by promoting competition between new jurisdictions. A new type 
of federalism based on Functional, Overlapping Competing Jurisdictions FOCJ is here proposed. 
FOCJ form a federal system of governments emerging from below as a response to citizens' 
preferences. The lowest political units (communes) must be given the freedom to engage in 
forming FOCJ and must have the right to levy taxes to finance the public services they 
provide. 
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A New Concept of European  
Federalism 
 
1. Integration as Harmonization – and its Alternative 
By opening markets the European integration has also become an economic success. 
The assurance of the four freedoms of liberal trade, with respect to goods and 
services, and capital and labor, have been achieved to a considerable degree. The 
European Union can be proud to have established a market covering almost the 
whole of Western Europe.  
With respect to political organization, however, the European Union is far less 
successful, if not an outright failure. A mistaken concept of what Europe should be, 
has increasingly taken over and the unification process has taken a wrong turn. The 
erroneous concept of a unified Europe consists in identifying integration with 
harmonization, which to a large extent means homogenization. But the essence of Europe 
is its diversity. The strength of Europe is its wide range of different ideas, cultures, 
institutions and policies. These differences have spurred its great achievements in the 
arts, sciences, and the way of living. A homogenized Europe loses its raison d'être, 
and will lose its economic and political importance. In contrast to the economic 
sphere, an open and competitive market for politics has been suppressed, rather than 
supported. No steps have been taken to actively institutionalize competition between 
governmental units at all levels. Rather, the European treaties and institutions have 
increasingly restricted competition between governments.  
This paper argues that the welfare of European citizens could be improved 
substantially by promoting competition between newly emerging jurisdictions 
organized according to functions instead of territories. A new type of federalism based 
on Functional, Overlapping Competing Jurisdictions is proposed. Hence, their acronym 
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FOCJ (one such jurisdiction will be called FOCUS) will be used. This system of 
democratic decentralized jurisdictions drastically differs from the system that 
governs the European Union today. FOCJ form a federal system of governments 
emerging from below as a response to citizens' preferences. The European 
Constitution proposed here must give the lowest political units (communes) the 
freedom to engage in forming FOCJ. The citizens must be given the right to establish 
FOCJ through popular referenda. The FOCJ must have the right to levy taxes to 
finance the public services they provide. 
The idea developed here is based on four basic elements: a future Europe has to be 
peaceful, democratic, diverse, and productive. Therefore, this proposal emphasizes the 
importance of the role of citizens in the political process. The proposal suggests a 
decentralization of the political process and its reduction to the functionally most 
appropriate level. It thus seeks to redress the two well-known and often lamented 
shortcomings of the European Union: its democracy deficit and its decentralization 
deficit. The subsidiarity principle enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty does not truly 
serve to mitigate the “decentralization deficit“. It remains ineffective as long as the 
regions of Europe financially depend on Brussels and on the central governments of 
their nations. Successful political decentralization requires that the lower levels of 
government have the power to tax. Such local fiscal responsibility induces the citizens 
to balance the benefits and costs of public expenditure and, thus, motivates 
politicians in lower-level governmental units to use the scarce resources for the 
benefit of the citizens. 
The vision entertained here may seem quite radical, but it is not outlandish. The 
proposal does not require the dismantling of the national states forming the 
European Union. Though the nationalism entailed in the concept of a nation has 
brought enormous harm to Europe in the 20th century, it is still exceedingly well 
established. The flexible political competitors suggested here cater to the effective 
provision of services to the citizens. As a consequence, traditional nation states are 
forced to substantiate their right of existence by caring efficiently for those needs and 
demands of the population that they are best able to provide. A major advantage of 
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the proposal is that it can be introduced in marginal steps. 
Section II discusses the relationships between governments and territory. Sections III 
and IV develop the concept of FOCJ and puts it into theoretical perspective. The 
following two sections discuss the strength and claimed weaknesses of the concept. 
Section VII provides contemporary examples of FOCJ. The following Section 
analyzes competing proposals for a future European federalism. The last Section IX 
concludes by discussing the possible role of FOCJ in the European Union. 
 
2. Relationships between Government and Territory 
A government or state has its corresponding territory. This is normally taken for granted. 
The relationship is one to one: Each government controls a particular territory, and 
each territory belongs to a particular government. Moreover, the relationship is 
clearly defined. There is no uncertainty which government rules over which 
particular territory, and each territory is unequivocally assigned to some 
government. 
Yet there are important instances in which this identification of government with 
territory does not hold: 
 
2.1. Several Governments on the Same Territory 
A classic case would be that several governments claim the same territory. 
Sometimes borders are ill-defined, sometimes the rights to a territory are disputed, 
and sometimes have been for centuries. This has been the cause for innumerable 
wars in the history of mankind. An important example that can lead several 
“governments” or “nations” to claim authority over the same territory is a claim by 
ethnic groups. The past conflicts in ex-Yugoslavia and many current conflicts in 
Africa and in many other parts of the world are examples of this. According to Singer 
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and Small [1982], in the period 1916-1939, no less than 80 percent of the wars 
occurring in (what is now called) the Third World were due to ethnic conflicts, which 
lead to civil strife. After 1945, this proportion rose to 90 percent. Overall, no less than 
75 percent of international wars are due to ethnic groups claiming authority over a 
territory. 
Federal states, in contrast, are a propitious institution allowing several governments 
to act in the same territory: the central state, the provinces, states or Bundesländer, and 
the communes.  
 
2.2. Governments Without Territory 
There are many different quasi-governmental organizations (QANGOs), which 
perform similar, if not identical, functions as states do. Examples for this are 
international organizations, such as the United Nations or the International Court of 
Justice in Den Haag. They consist of member countries, but they do not have any 
monopoly power over a territory. The number and importance of such “virtual” 
governments has increased considerably. At least 350 intergovernmental 
international organizations exist with far more than 100'000 employees. A more 
extensive definition, based on the Yearbook of International Organizations lists more 
than 1000 intergovernmental units (see e.g. Frey 1997). 
Religious organizations, of which the Catholic Church is a good example, represent 
another case of virtual governments. The Catholic Church has a monopoly over a 
tiny territory in Rome, but its importance derives from a completely different source, 
namely the allegiance of its members. To some extent it performs similar activities to 
regular governments (e.g. it pursues a foreign policy) and it even raises taxes. 
Perhaps more relevant today are sports organizations, some of which have 
substantial resources available. One example is FIFA, the international football 
association. They also undertake some government-like activities (e.g. they impose 
rules on their members, they have a foreign policy, undertake development aid etc.). 
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The same applies to cultural associations and international activist groups (such as 
Greenpeace), which are not connected to a territory. 
Profit-making global firms are the most important virtual governments without 
territory. The more traditional ones still own plants located in specific countries, but 
the digital revolution has created a rapidly increasing number of knowledge firms in 
the New Economy. Their only capital are human resources and ideas, and they are 
not attached to any territory at all. Quite often, the turnover of such companies is 
compared to the size of the public sectors of territorial states. Only a few large 
countries can match the size of the largest international companies. Such firms 
perform governmental functions in the sense that they influence the daily lives of 
their members at least as strongly as states do (e.g. they impose what language is to 
be spoken, and which rules are to be followed), and they negotiate on an equal 
footing with national states. 
International organizations, churches and global firms do not meet the traditional 
legal definitions of a “government”. These units are indeed not identical to 
governments. But it should also be kept in mind that the traditional definitions of 
government are based on the simplistic notion that it is the nature of governments to 
have a territorial monopoly. But the purpose of this discussion is precisely to 
question this assumption from a social science and economic point of view. Adopting 
this radically different viewpoint, it becomes clear that there are indeed multiple 
governments on any given territory, as well as governments without territory. 
Governments need not have a territorial monopoly.  
 
3. Federalism and Political Competition 
The basic idea of federalism is that the preferences of individuals can better be met 
by decentralizing government activity. The goods and services offered by the 
government can more narrowly be geared to these demands because they differ with 
respect to: 
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• geographical and physical characteristics, e.g. between mountainous regions 
and planes; or between rural areas and cities; 
• ethnicity, culture and traditions; 
• economic structure, e.g. with respect to the amount of agricultural and 
industrial production and services; and 
• social structure, e.g. with respect to income distribution, the number of young 
families with children and retired persons. 
These differences obviously lead to varying demands for public activity, e.g. with 
respect to the expenditures desired for educational or social services. In a purely 
technocratic concept of politics, a centralized government can meet such spatially 
varied demands. However, this utterly disregards human behavior and essentially 
assumes the existence of an omniscient and benevolent planner. However, long ago 
this notion was rejected theoretically by Smith (1776) for economics and for society as 
a whole by von Hayek [1960; 1978]. In the political sphere, decentralization has clear 
informational advantages, because local politicians are more aware of the local needs 
and constraints. Even more important are the incentives motivating local political 
decision-makers to cater to the wishes of the local population who elects them. 
The Economic Theory of Federalism (see e.g. Oates [1972]; [1977], [1999]; Bird [1993]; 
Inman and Rubinfeld [1997]) has focused on four important theoretical elements: 
Fiscal Equivalence (Olson [1969]; Oates [1972]; Olson [1986]). Each jurisdiction 
should extend over an area in such a way that the recipients of benefits and 
taxpayers correspond as closely as possible. Spatial external effects – positive 
spillovers where non-payers benefit from public services, and negative spillovers 
where outsiders are burdened with costs – are therewith avoided. The various 
public activities are to be attributed to the most appropriate government level. 
Clubs (Buchanan [1965]). These are institutions offering public goods only – i.e. 
goods from whose benefits nobody can be excluded – to its members. The 
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optimal size of a club is reached when the marginal utility received corresponds 
to the marginal cost induced by an additional member. A club thus has a limited 
membership, and only those persons are admitted who are prepared to carry the 
marginal cost they impose. 
Voting by Foot (Tiebout [1956]). Competition between jurisdictions is brought 
about by citizens' mobility. Public jurisdictions can be looked at as enterprises 
offering local services in return for taxes. The citizens migrate to those 
jurisdictions that have the most favorable relationship between services and tax 
prices. The competition created forces the jurisdictions to take the citizens' wishes 
into account and to supply services at the lowest possible cost. The same holds 
for the location decision of firms. 
Exit and Voice (Hirschman [1970]; [1993]). In addition to the option to choose 
among the supply of various jurisdictions, citizens may also participate in the 
political decisions of the jurisdictions they belong to, either by voting in elections 
or referenda. Moreover, they may make themselves heard through protests, 
demonstrations, strikes and uprisings. Initially, exit and voice were seen as 
substitutes. A citizen who chooses to leave a jurisdiction has little incentive to go 
through the trouble of protesting. However, under particular circumstances the 
relationship may be complementary. Thus, when the government of the GDR 
had to grant exit permits to its citizens (or: had to allow its citizens to leave) (via 
Hungary to the West), this was generally interpreted as a sign of weakness of the 
Communist regime. As a consequence, protests and demonstrations were 
perceived as less dangerous and more promising, and therefore grew into a mass 
movement (the so-called "Monday Demonstrations"), eventually forcing the 
resignation of the regime. 
For federalism to work in a satisfactory way, two crucial conditions need to be met: 
(a) The sub-units must have the power to tax citizens for the services they 
perform. This forces sub-units to balance the benefits and costs of 
government activities. At the same time, this gives the sub-units a certain 
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degree of independence from the central government. However, this 
requirement is not met in most "federations". As a consequence, local 
politicians engage in widespread rent seeking activities with the central 
administration. To obtain funds they have to please the political decision 
makers at the centre. Once granted, they have few incentives not to spend 
them in their entirety, as such funds have the character of a "free good". The 
local politicians' rent seeking activities also encompass subsidies to cover 
budget deficits. Such an institutional landscape fosters fiscal irresponsibility 
at the local level. As this "irresponsibility" is a direct consequence of the high 
degree of centralization, it does not occur when local politicians have the 
competence to balance revenues and expenditures in their own jurisdiction. If 
it turns out that they are incapable of doing so, the citizens will throw them 
out of office. 
(b) To guarantee a well-functioning federalism local politicians must be elected by 
the citizens of their jurisdictions, and not by a larger electorate, let alone be 
appointed by the central government. This requirement aligns the politicians' 
incentives with the wishes of the local population. 
Most currently existing federal governments do not meet these two requirements, or 
do so only to a small degree. For that reason, the proposal for a new type of 
federalism is advanced, which is a combination of the four aspects of federalism 
discussed above: (1) it meets the condition of "fiscal equivalence" by suggesting a 
network of multiple and overlapping governmental units; (2) it is based on well-
defined members and boundaries according to the public functions to be performed, 
and thus is comparable to a "club"; (3) it is competitive by allowing entry and exit of 
members according to the "voting by foot" mechanism; and (4) it adds political 
competition via elections and referenda and thus includes institutions favoring 
"voice". 
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4. Competing Jurisdictions 
The federal units here proposed are called "FOCJ" according to the acronym of its 
essential characteristics: 
• Functional (F): the new political units extend over variable areas, 
corresponding to the tasks or functions to be fulfilled; 
• Overlapping (O): in line with the many different tasks (functions), there are 
corresponding governmental units extending over different geographical 
areas, which necessarily intersect; 
• Competing (C): individuals and/or communities may choose to which 
governmental unit they want to belong, and they have political rights to 
express their preferences directly via initiatives and referenda; 
• Jurisdictions (J): the units established are governmental; they have 
enforcement power and can, in particular, levy taxes. 
FOCJ form a governmental system, which in an essential aspect is quite different 
from the one suggested in the economic theory of federalism. This theory analyses 
the behavior of given political units at the different levels of government, while FOCJ 
emerge in response to the 'geography of problems'. 
The four elements of FOCJ are now discussed in more detail. 
 
4.1. Functions 
Any particular public service that benefits a certain geographical area should be 
financed through the people living in that area, i.e. there should be no spillovers. The 
different governmental units can cater to a population’s preferences and 
accommodate differences, more precisely, to the citizenry’s demands. To minimize 
cost, these units have to exploit economies of scale in production. As the latter may 
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strongly differ between functions (e.g., between schools, police, hospitals, power 
plants and defense) there is an additional reason for uni-functional (or few-
functional) governmental units of different sizes. This endogeneity of the extension of 
the governmental units constitutes an essential part of FOCJ. 
 
4.2. Overlaps 
FOCJ may overlap in two respects: (i) FOCJ performing different functions may 
intersect; (ii) two or more FOCJ offering the same services may geographically 
intersect (e.g., a multitude of school FOCJ may exist in one geographical area). An 
individual or a political community usually belongs to a variety of different FOCJ at 
the same time. FOCJ need not be physically contiguous, and they need not have a 
monopoly over a certain area of land. Thus, this concept completely differs from 
archaic nationalism, which often leads to land disputes. It also breaks with the 
concept of federalist theory that units at the same level may not overlap. 
 
4.3. Competition 
The heads of FOCJ are induced to conform closely to their members' preferences by 
means of two mechanisms: while the individuals' and communities' possibilities to 
exit mimics market competition, their right to vote establishes political competition. It 
should be noted that migration is only one means of exit; often, membership in a 
particular FOCUS (this is the singular of FOCJ) can be discontinued without 
changing one's residence. Exit is not limited to individuals or firms; also political 
communities as a whole, or parts thereof exercise this option. Moreover, exit may be 
total or only partial. In the latter case, an individual or community only participates 
in a restricted set of FOCUS activities. 
In order for FOCJ to establish competition between governments, exit should be 
restrained as little as possible. In contrast, entry need not necessarily be free. As for 
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individuals entering Buchanan-type clubs, jurisdictions and individuals may be 
asked a price if they want to join a particular FOCUS and benefit from its public 
goods. The existing members of the particular FOCUS have to democratically decide 
whether a new member pays an adequate entry price and is thus welcome. 
Competition also needs to be furthered through political institutions, as the exit 
option does not suffice to induce governments to act efficiently. The citizens should 
directly elect the persons managing the FOCJ, and should be given the right to 
initiate popular referenda on specific issues. These democratic institutions are known 
to raise efficiency in the sense of meeting individual preferences (on elections, see 
Downs [1957], Mueller [1989], for referenda Cronin [1989], Frey [1994]). 
 
4.4. Jurisdictions 
A FOCUS is a democratic governmental unit with authority over its citizens, 
including the power to tax. According to the two types of overlap, two forms of 
membership can be distinguished: (i) The lowest political unit (normally the 
community), and all its corresponding citizens automatically become citizens of the 
FOCJ to which their community belongs. In that case, an individual can only exit by 
relocating. (ii) Individuals may freely choose whether they want to belong to a 
particular FOCUS but, while they are its citizens, they are subject to its authority. 
Such FOCJ may be non-voluntary in the sense that one must belong to a FOCUS 
providing for a certain function, e.g., to a school-FOCUS, and must pay the 
corresponding taxes. An analogy here is health insurance, which in many countries is 
obligatory, but individuals are free to choose any insurance company. The citizens of 
such a school-FOCUS may then decide that everyone must pay taxes in order to 
finance a particular school, irrespective of whether one has children. With respect to 
FOCJ providing functions with significant redistributive effects, a minimal regulation 
by the central government may grant that, e.g., citizens without children may abstain 
from joining 'school-FOCJ', which in effect do not offer any schooling and therefore 
have correspondingly low (or zero) taxes. 
A New Concept of European Federalism 
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5. Strengths of FOCJ 
FOCJ compare favorably to traditional forms of federalism with respect to 
government incentives and possibilities to satisfy heterogeneous preferences of the 
individual. Due to the concentration on one functional area, the citizens of a 
particular FOCUS receive better information on its activity, and are in a better 
position to compare its performance to other governments. As many benefits and 
costs extend over a quite limited geographic area, we envisage FOCJ to be small in 
size, which is also helpful for voters' evaluations. The exit option provided by the 
existence of overlapping jurisdictions is also an important means to make one's 
preferences known to governmental suppliers. 
Moreover, FOCJ are able to provide public services at low cost, because they are 
formed in order to minimize inter-jurisdictional spillovers and to exploit economies 
of scale. When the benefits of a specific activity indivisibly extend over large areas, 
and when there are decreasing costs, the corresponding optimal FOCUS may cover 
many communities, several nations, or even Europe as a whole. Defense against 
aggression from outside may be an example where the appropriate FOCUS may 
extend over the whole of Europe (even beyond the European Union). 
The threat of dissatisfied citizens or communities exiting the FOCUS, and the benefit 
of new citizens and communities joining, gives the politicians in charge an incentive 
to take the preferences of the citizens into account and to provide public services 
efficiently. FOCJ may also open up the politicians' cartel to competent outsiders. 
While all-purpose jurisdictions attract people with broad and non-specialized 
knowledge to become politicians, in FOCJ individuals with a well-grounded 
knowledge in a particular functional area (say education or refuse collection) are 
successful. 
A federal network composed of FOCJ certainly affects the role of the nation-states. 
They will definitely be relieved of those functions if they do not fulfill them 
according to the population's preferences, or of those, which they perform at higher 
cost than FOCJ designed to exploit cost advantages. On the other hand, the scheme 
Bruno S. Frey 
 
                                                                                                                                      
13 
does not purport to do away with nations, but allows for multi-national, as well as 
small-scale alternatives where they are so desired by the citizens. Nation-states 
subsist in so far as they provide functions efficiently according to the voters' 
preferences. 
 
6. Claimed Weaknesses of FOCJ 
There are four major criticisms, which could be advanced against the concept of 
FOCJ. 
Citizens are overburdened by the voting load. In a federal system of 
FOCJ, each individual is a citizen of various jurisdictions. As a consequence, 
individuals may be overburdened by the voting in elections and referenda that 
take place in each FOCUS. However, citizens in a direct-democratic FOCUS 
find it much easier to politically participate, as they have only to assess one or 
two concrete issues at a time. The referenda and elections in the various FOCJ 
can be held at the same time, say on three or four dates per year, and the votes 
can, without any problems, be cast by mail or E-mail. 
Citizens are cognitively overburdened. An individual is confronted with a 
multitude of suppliers of public services, which arguably could make life 
difficult. However, FOCJ do not cause the dimensionality of politics to grow. 
Rather, the dimensionality is made explicit. The evidence from private 
consumer markets shows us that citizens are able to cognitively master an 
incredibly broad array of matters, if they have the appropriate information. 
However, FOCJ provide stronger incentives and opportunities for citizens to be 
politically informed than traditional forms of government do. Membership in 
FOCJ is decided on a local or even private level, and the performance of 
functional units can easily be monitored through comparison and 
benchmarking. If citizens, nevertheless, fear that the appropriate information is 
lacking, a governmental or a private advisory service can be established, which 
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offers information and support for the consumers' needs and wishes.  
Coordination is needed. While co-ordination is obviously often needed, co-
ordination between governments is not necessarily beneficial. It sometimes 
serves to build cartels among the members of the 'classe politique' who then 
evade or even exploit the population's wishes (see CEPR 1993, Vaubel 1994, 
Frey 1994). As far as welfare increasing co-ordination is concerned, its need is 
reduced because the FOCJ emerge in order to minimize externalities. If major 
spillovers between FOCJ exist, new FOCJ will be founded, so taking care of 
these externalities. 
Income needs to be redistributed. It is sometimes claimed that all forms of 
federalism - including FOCJ - undermine redistribution. Moreover, FOCJ are 
claimed to emerge especially in high-income areas. As far as redistribution is 
based on the citizens' solidarity or on insurance principles, this fear is 
unwarranted. Only as far as redistribution is indeed a pure public good, and 
thus must be enforced to prevent free-riding, may a problem arise. But even 
then, FOCJ compare favorably to traditional forms of federalism; they lead to 
less geographical segregation because the citizens can select their supplies 
without relocating. However, recent empirical research (Gold 1991, 
Kirchgässner and Pommerehne 1996, Ashworth, Heyndels and Smolders 2002) 
suggests that substantial redistribution is feasible in federal systems. Moreover, 
to the extent that redistribution is a pure public good, it will be delegated to 
higher level governments or, perhaps, to specialized redistribution FOCJ at the 
national or European levels. 
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7. Contemporary Examples of FOCJ  
In two countries, functional, overlapping and competing jurisdictions exist (but they 
do not in every case meet all the requirements of FOCJ specified above). 
In the United States, special districts play a significant role in the American federalist 
system, and their numbers have substantially increased over the last decades. While 
some of the special districts are dependent, others are both autonomous and 
democratically organized. According to empirical research (Mehay [1984]), the latter 
type is significantly more efficient. Not surprisingly, existing municipalities make an 
effort to prevent the emergence of these more efficient governmental units. Thus, for 
example, in various states, a minimum population size is required and various 
administrative restrictions are imposed. 
In Switzerland, a multitude of governmental units exist, some of which resembling 
FOCJ. In addition to the 26 cantons, there are roughly 8,000 communes of various 
forms. The most important are the 2,940 political communes, which define 
citizenship (i.e. a Swiss is not a citizen of the nation but of a political commune). 
These communes have considerable autonomy; in particular they have wide-ranging 
authority to impose taxes on income and property. As a consequence, the tax rates 
between neighboring political communes may differ strongly – a factor inducing 
political competition between communes, and bundles of public services and taxes, 
which are favorable to the citizens. In addition to political communes, there are 
roughly 5,000 overlapping, functional special communes. The most important are 
school communes offering education to the children of one or several political 
communes. They are public jurisdictions levying their own taxes, the rates of which 
are determined at a citizens' meeting. Other functional, democratic, and overlapping 
communes are those established by the Protestant and Catholic Churches. A citizen 
may freely choose to which one he or she wishes to belong, but once a member, one 
has to pay an appropriate tax. In addition to these and other types of communes, 
there are many thousands of "communal units" ("Gemeindeverbände" or 
"Zweckverbände") founded by the communes to deal with specific tasks such as, 
A New Concept of European Federalism 
 
 
16 
hospitals, nursing homes, maintenance of sewage systems or refuse collection. These 
units have, however, no independent power to tax and there rarely exist direct 
participation rights for citizens. This short discussion of the Swiss federal system at 
the local level (see more extensively De Spindler [1998]) shows that FOCJ are a 
practical possibility, but that they have not yet been developed to their full extent. 
A completely different kind of FOCJ develops in Cyberspace. An example is the 
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), the body that 
now administers Internet domain names. 
 It could well evolve into a global regulation institution without any territorial 
boundaries. While laws that govern business conduct are primarily country-specific, 
the Internet acknowledges no such geographic borders, and net firms can move from 
one jurisdiction to another by switching the location of their servers. ICANN is not a 
governmental institution (though it was initiated by the US government); it is based 
on openness and collaboration rather than closed procedural regulation. It seeks to 
establish wider legitimacy by holding democratic elections, relies on voluntary 
dispute-resolution channels, and adapts its policy to rapidly changing technology. 
This new kind of Cyberspace body thus has several features of FOCJ: it is functional 
and overlapping; it allows entry and exit and establishes democratic accountability; 
and it imposes prices (taxes) for its services. It is much closer to the idea of FOCJ 
developed here than to traditional forms of government. 
 
8. Competing Proposals 
FOCJ differ in many crucial respects from other proposals concerning a future 
European constitution. One of the most prominent proposals is Buchanan’s (1991), 
who stresses an individual nation's right to secede but, somewhat surprisingly, does 
not build on Buchanan-type clubs. The European Constitutional Group (1993) 
focuses on the example of the American constitution, and presents constructivist 
proposals with respect to the houses of parliament and the respective voting weights 
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of the various countries. They do not allow for overlapping jurisdictions and 
referenda, and the exit option is strongly restricted. Other economics scholars (e.g., 
Blöchliger and R.L. Frey 1992, Schneider 1992) suggest a strengthening of federalism 
in the traditional sense (i.e. through multi-purpose federal units) but do not envisage 
overlapping jurisdictions. The report by the Centre for Economic Policy Research 
(1993, 1995) criticizes “subsidiarity” (as used in the Maastricht Treaty) to be a 
meaningless concept, as they argue that good theoretical reasons must be provided 
to justify central government intervention. But the report does not deal with the 
institutions necessary to guarantee that policy follows such theoretical advice. The 
idea of overlapping, not geographically based jurisdictions, is briefly raised (1993, 
pp. 54-55) but is not institutionally or practically worked through, nor is the need for 
a democratic organization and the power of taxation acknowledged. 
The proposal by European level politicians (Herman report of the European 
Parliament, 1994) mainly deals with the organization of the parliamentary system 
(the houses of parliament and the national vote weights) and to a substantial extent 
accepts the existing treatises as the founding blocks of the European constitution. The 
central idea of competition between governments is neglected; the report prefers to 
speak of the necessary “co-operation” between governments – which in fact often 
serves to undermine the threat of competition. 
FOCJ are also quite different from the regions envisioned in existing European 
treaties and institutions (see, e.g., Adonis and Jones 1991). A significant difference is 
that FOCJ emerge from below, while the 'European regions' tend to be established 
from above. Moreover, their existence strongly depends on the subsidies flowing 
from the European Union and the nation states (Sharpe 1993). In contrast, the 
concept of FOCJ corresponds to Hayek's (1960) non-constructivist process view. It 
cannot a priori be determined from outside or from above, which FOCJ will be 
efficient in the future. This must be left to the competitive democratic process that 
takes place at the level of individuals and communities. The central European 
constitution needs to make sure that other government units, in particular nation 
states, do not obstruct the emergence of FOCJ. In contrast to Hayek’s proposal, 
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however, the scheme allows for a (closely restricted) set of central regulations, as 
mentioned above. Moreover, Hayek measures efficiency through survival in the 
evolutionary process, while efficiency is defined here in terms of the fulfillment of 
citizens' demands. 
“Subsidiarity”, as proclaimed in the Maastricht Treaty, is generally perceived to be 
more of a vague ambition than a concrete concept with substantial content (see, e.g., 
Centre for Economic Policy Research 1993, pp. 19-23). Even if subsidiarity were taken 
seriously, it would not lead to a veritable federal structure, because many (actual or 
prospective) members of the European Union are essentially unitary states without 
any federal sub-units of significant competence (examples are the Netherlands, 
France or Sweden). The “regions” existing in the European Union (examples are 
Galicia and Cataluña in Spain, or South Tyrol and Sicily in Italy) are far from being 
units with significant autonomous functional and fiscal competencies.  
The Council of Ministers is a European decision making institution based on federal 
principles (but only nations are represented) and organized according to functional 
principles (or at least according to the corresponding administrative units). However, 
this Council is only indirectly democratic (the ministers are members of 
governments, which are democratically legitimized by the representative system) 
and the deliberations are not public. Exit from the European Union is not formally 
regulated, and exceptions to specific aspects of agreements reached (as in the 
Maastricht Treaty concerning the European Monetary Union and the Protocol on 
Social Policy, or in the Schengen Treaty concerning the free movement of persons) 
are granted only reluctantly. Indeed, they are seen as damaging the “spirit of 
Europe”.  
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9. Conclusion: FOCJ and the European Union 
Functional, Overlapping and Competing Jurisdictions may be considered a most 
useful concept for the European Union. This flexible set of institutions allows its 
citizens to have their divergent preferences fulfilled better than under the present 
inflexible institutional arrangements. The size of governmental units adjusts to the 
problems to be solved rather than being determined by historical flukes. To some 
extent the European Union already faces the problem that its present type of 
federalism is ill suited for the problems at hand.  This is most obvious when it comes 
to the integration of additional countries into the Union. The case of Turkey is 
especially relevant. In several countries of the European Union many voters seem to 
think that some of the religious and political features of Turkey do not fit well into 
the Union, and some even fear that an entry would jeopardize basic human rights. 
Accordingly, some governments of EU member countries are reluctant to support the 
membership of Turkey, or even oppose it. A flexible integration via FOCJ would 
provide a way out without any side losing face. Turkey could immediately become a 
member with respect to those functions with little or no opposition, such as free 
trade in goods and services. Such a FOCUS would undoubtedly be beneficial for 
both the European Union and Turkey, and should therefore not be delayed. There 
are certainly many other areas, or functions, for which Turkey could easily be 
admitted into the Union. In contrast, a political union with Turkey does not find a 
consensus among the present member countries, nor does a free movement of labor. 
Within the flexible concept of FOCJ these issues can be delayed without harming 
progress in other areas. It would, moreover, allow Turkey, and the European Union, 
to extend beyond its present geographical boundaries. Thus, for instance, a full free 
trade arrangement with Turkey could also include the Maghreb countries as well as 
Eastern European countries such as the Ukraine and Georgia. At the same time, those 
member states of the European Union, which do not agree to such FOCJ, do not have 
to participate. In that way, these countries become more closely associated with those 
West European countries willing to cooperate. Such a move can be expected to 
contribute to not only the economic, but also to the political development towards 
A New Concept of European Federalism 
 
 
20 
democracy and the rule of law in countries presently excluded from the European 
Union. Democratic and market orientated countries like Norway, Switzerland and 
Iceland which do not wish to participate in all the treaties binding the present 
members of the Union, could participate in some of them. Such FOCJ would be 
beneficial for both sides.  
The idea of establishing a multitude of FOCJ connected with countries of the 
European Union will certainly evoke fierce opposition from many quarters. Many 
adherents of European integration will argue that such “partial” integration 
undermines the idea of “unity” among the Europeans. This argument disregards that 
the strength of Europe lies in its diversity, and that imposing equal rules and 
standards all over Europe stands against this spirit. But the history of the European 
integration shows that partial integration has been the only possibility to safeguard 
the integration process. This has been made most obvious when several member 
countries refused to join the Euro-zone. From the point of view of flexible integration 
proposed here, the models of “variable geometry”, “multi-track”, “multi-speed”, 
“two-tier”, “hard core”, “concentric circles”, or “Europe à la carte” should be 
welcomed, rather than rejected. But it should be kept in mind that the concept of 
FOCJ sketched here differs from the models that have just been mentioned in several 
respects. FOCJ emerge from below when the citizens and the politicians representing 
them become aware that a particular function can no longer be profitably performed 
in isolation and that it is, therefore, beneficial to establish new democratic 
governmental structures with taxing authority. With respect to such a particular 
function, the integration is based on the consensus of all participants. The situation is 
not characterized by a well-established center (in the case of the European Union the 
Commission, the Parliament and the Courts) but by democratic actors of all levels 
(including regions and communes) jointly undertaking a public task, and taxing the 
citizens accordingly. 
The organization of states today does not follow the model of FOCJ for two major 
reasons. An obvious, but decisive one, is that individuals and communities are 
prohibited from establishing such jurisdictions, and in many countries of the 
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European Union, communities are not even allowed to formally collaborate without 
the consent of the central government (see Sharpe [1993]). Secondly, FOCJ violate the 
interests of politicians and public officials at higher levels of government. FOCJ 
reduce the public suppliers' power and increases citizens' influence by the newly 
introduced mechanisms of competition by entry and exit, and by direct democratic 
elements; both are regularly opposed by the politicians in power. 
A federal system of FOCJ will not arise if these barriers are not overcome. A 
necessary condition is new constitutional rules, allowing the formation of FOCJ and 
giving citizens and governments the right to appeal to the Constitutional Court if 
they are blocked. 
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